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Abstract: This paper considers the relationship between the UK and 
its Caribbean Overseas Territories (OTs) since the Conservative
coalition government won power in May 2010. There is 
the UK government’s recent White Paper on the OTs; the balance of 
authority between the UK and the territories in areas such as good 
governance and economic reform; the attitude of the territories to 
the present political settlement; and the 
autonomy can be encouraged. It is clear that the UK’s role in the 
territories has become more assertive over the last three years, but 
the UK has also tried to build a more constructive and positive set of 
relations with the territories. The response of the territories to this 
has been mixed. Some are happy with the status quo, while others are 
critical. Notwithstanding it is likely that the existing arrangements 
will be maintained for the foreseeable future. What is crucial, 
however, is managing relations in an effective manner, which in turn 
could lead to the territories achieving greater autonomy in the 
medium-term. 
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On entering government in May 2010 the UK Conservative
Coalition was faced with a number of challenges in regard to its 
Overseas Territories (OTs) in the Caribbean, including dealing with 
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the problems resulting from the corruption allegations in the Turks 
and Caicos Islands (TCI); addressing the economic fragility in 
several territories; and overcoming an underlying fractiousness 
between the UK and the OTs which had developed towards the end 
of the Labour Party’s time in office. Since 2010 these challenges, 
and several others, have been addressed, but in doing so the UK’s 
role in the territories has become more assertive. This obviously 
has implications – certainly in the short and medium term – for the 
territories capacity to achieve greater autonomy and possibly full 
decolonisation as defined by the United Nations (UN).1 This paper 
considers the reforms that have been enacted over the last three 
years, including the recent White Paper on the OTs; the state-of-
play vis-à-vis the balance of authority between the UK and the 
territories; the response of the territories to the present situation; 
and the ways in which further autonomy can be encouraged. 
 
THE 2012 WHITE PAPER 
 
On 28 June 2012 a White Paper on the OTs sub-titled Security, 
Success and Sustainability was published by the UK government.2 
The White Paper sets out the nature of the existing links between 
the UK and its 14 OTs and the measures required to ‘renew and 
strengthen’ the relationship.3 The Coalition government felt – 
perhaps correctly – that towards the end of the Labour Party’s time 
in power relations with at least some of the territories were 
becoming increasingly fractious and several political and economic 
problems in the territories required stronger corrective action, 
supported by a ‘very strong positive vision’.4 Thus the White Paper 
attempts a balance between promoting a more positive overall 
agenda while making clear the responsibilities and high standards 
of governance the territories must maintain. 
From the outset the White Paper refers to the ‘valued 
partnership within the Realm’5 and the mutual benefits gained 
from the relationship. For the UK that includes a global presence; a 
set of strategic assets; economic and financial opportunities; and 
access to significant natural and environmental resources (the 
territories comprise 90 percent of the biodiversity of the UK and 
territories combined). For the territories advantages include UK 
defence and security guarantees; economic and technical 
assistance; and reputational benefits. The White Paper also makes 
very clear that all UK government departments are ‘committed to 
engaging with supporting the Territories’6 – not just the Foreign 
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and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Department for 
International Development (DFID) – to establish a mutually 
beneficial relationship. Stronger political links between the UK and 
the territories are also encouraged through a new Joint Ministerial 
Council, supported by a small secretariat, which replaces the more 
ad hoc and rather ineffective Overseas Territories Consultative 
Council. Further, the White Paper highlights the government’s 
desire to promote broader engagement with the territories via 
local government, private companies and non-governmental 
organisations, and also the sharing of best practice between the 
territories. 
In relation to specific policy areas the White Paper includes 
chapters on defence, security, and safety; economic development 
and resilience; the natural environment; good governance; 
education, health, culture and sport; and the territories’ links with 
the wider world. Within these chapters several considerations 
standout: (1) Territories must ‘abide by the same basic standards 
of good government as in the UK’,7 which means inter alia 
maintaining the highest standards in public life, strengthening the 
public service, and safeguarding fundamental rights and freedoms. 
(2) Territories must follow ‘prudent fiscal management and 
effective fiscal planning’8 to become as financially self-reliant as 
possible – if not the UK government will intervene. However, the 
UK will strongly defend the territories’ offshore financial sectors 
and provide financial support, including investments to promote 
growth, when called upon. (3) Greater efforts will be made to 
develop the territories’ links with key organisations such as the UN, 
the Commonwealth, the European Union, and the Caribbean 
Community (CARICOM). 
The publication of the White Paper was timely in reaffirming 
the importance of the relationship and setting out clearly the 
priorities of the UK government over the next few years. Further, 
particular initiatives such as the Joint Ministerial Council, the 
emphasis on deepening ties beyond the FCO and DFID, and 
projecting a more positive view of the relationship are to be 
welcomed. However, the White Paper is in many respects very 
similar to the previous White Paper – Partnership for Progress and 
Prosperity – produced by the Labour government in 1999.9 Because 
there is no desire on the part of the Coalition to change the 
fundamental nature of the relationship and little pressure to force 
independence, managing relations in an effective manner is the 
most important challenge. 
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POLITICAL ISSUES: THE TCI AND BEYOND 
 
In the TCI a general election was held on 9 November 2012, just 
over three years since direct rule was imposed by the UK 
government after serious allegations of corruption were revealed. 
The election was won very narrowly by the Progressive National 
Party (PNP) who had been in office when self-government was 
suspended in August 2009. Just prior to the election a new 
constitution came into force on 15 October 2012. Compared to the 
previous 2006 constitution, the new version includes stronger 
powers for the governor and the UK government. The UK felt this 
was necessary to make sure the previous corruption and 
mismanagement in the territory could not re-occur. There are 
several provisions designed to enhance the accountability of 
executive government. For example, all organs of government are 
obliged to give effect to a ‘Statement of Governance Principles’, 
which was formulated by the UK secretary of state after 
consultation with the TCI. The governor also has powers to act 
contrary to cabinet advice, or even exceptionally to enact 
legislation, to ensure compliance with the Statement of Governance 
Principles. 
With self-rule now returned, but with greater UK oversight 
tensions are apparent between the TCI and UK. In February 2013, 
Premier Ewing warned CARICOM Heads of Government that there 
was a risk of ‘chaos’ in the country, criticised the actions of the UK, 
and called for the ‘full restoration’ of democracy and the removal of 
‘colonial influences’.10 In a strongly worded response UK Foreign 
Secretary William Hague accused the Premier of ‘misrepresenting’ 
the country’s situation, and he reminded him that the previous PNP 
government had ‘left behind a chaotic situation’. Hague continued, 
‘[t]he UK government has invested much in helping put TCI back on 
the right path. I hope you will use this inheritance wisely’.11 
The Cayman Islands has also witnessed a period of political 
instability, after Premier McKeeva Bush was arrested on suspicion 
of theft and allegedly importing explosive substances without valid 
permits in December 2012. (He was formally charged on 20 
March.) Subsequently, Bush lost a vote of no confidence in the 
Legislative Assembly after five of his colleagues supported the 
motion – those colleagues then formed a new government. This 
move against Bush was precipitated in part by what had happened 
in the TCI – Cayman politicians felt it was necessary to act first, 
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rather than risk a repeat of the TCI experience. Indeed, the arrest of 
Bush was the culmination of a period of increasingly strained 
relations between the ex-premier and the Governor and the FCO. 
Bush during his premiership had taken an aggressive stance 
towards the Governor and the UK. Bush on many occasions had 
talked about ‘bureaucratic harassment’ and ‘meddling’. It is true 
that the Governor and the UK have taken a more pro-active role in 
the Cayman Islands, but there have been legitimate concerns about 
the path the country has taken – in particular the overly dominant 
role Bush has played in Caymanian politics and the somewhat lax 
approach to budget management and government procurement 
(see below).  
Further, the UK’s present engagement in the Cayman Islands 
(and in other territories) is framed by the previous unattended 
failings in the TCI. The arrest of Bush was unconnected to the 
policy clashes that had taken place, but it is a sign that greater 
attention is now being paid to good governance with a strong lead 
being given by the Governor and the UK. Former premier Bush 
tried but ultimately failed to challenge the constitutional 
supremacy of the UK government, and as a consequence his own 
position was seriously undermined. Since Bush stepped down as 
premier the mood music coming out of the Cayman Islands in 
relation to the UK has been more positive. There are indications 
that many in Cayman believe that the politics of division and 
conflict have damaged the country’s reputation and undermined its 
economy. Now there is hope that a more positive political climate 
can be shaped. However, it is uncertain whether some other 
territories, including the TCI, will follow suit. The absence of 
mutual trust and confidence is a real barrier towards the awarding 
of further autonomy, and without improvements the UK 




Despite the territories relatively high levels of economic 
development most rely on a few key industries – particularly 
financial services, tourism and construction – for both government 
revenue and employment. The proportion of government revenue 
generated by financial services and tourism is approximately 50 
per cent for the majority of territories, whilst they account for 
between 23 per cent and 48 per cent of employment.12 The 
vulnerability of government revenue is particularly acute since the 
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territories have a narrow revenue base. There are no taxes levied 
on income, profits and capital gains, nor are there sales or value 
added taxes. Rather revenue is derived from a combination of 
import duties, financial sector licence fees and other specific 
charges. Thus many OT economies are ‘particularly exposed to 
economic shocks’.13 
The territories suffered during the recession from reduced 
activity in their financial services sector and declines in tourist 
arrivals and construction. As a result, the economies stagnated and 
fiscal deficits increased. The growing budgetary pressures were 
particularly acute in Anguilla, the Cayman Islands, and the TCI (the 
latter’s situation being exacerbated by the previous government’s 
corruption and mismanagement). This has led the UK government 
to take a stronger hand in economic matters. For example, in both 
Anguilla and the Cayman Islands the UK has forced revisions to 
local budgets to cut spending and raise revenue. Further, the UK 
and all the territories have agreed Frameworks for Fiscal 
Responsibility – legislation that commitments the territory 
governments to be prudent and transparent on fiscal and debt 
management, establishes borrowing limits, and lays down the 
stages that must be followed in the planning, development and 
execution of a project. The latter obligation was particular 
pertinent for the Cayman Islands as in November 2012 talks with 
China Harbour Engineering to develop the main port were ended 
after criticism from the UK government. FCO Minister Henry 
Bellingham had publicly criticised the way in which former 
Premier Bush had conducted the negotiations. 
As well as direct economic impacts, the global financial crisis 
has led to changes in the international regulation of offshore 
financial centres (OFCs). For example, the US Congress passed the 
Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act in 2010 which came into force 
in January 2013. The Act requires both US citizens and foreigners 
living in the US to disclose information about their overseas 
holdings in their tax returns or risk large penalties. Further, foreign 
financial institutions are required to report on income earned by 
their US account holders, or face US-imposed fines. Similar 
measures are being introduced in Europe. As a consequence 
holdings in OFCs are coming under greater scrutiny. Indeed, the 
whole narrative around OFCs has become more critical. 
So it is clear that the level of economic oversight of the 
territories, both on the part of the UK and the international 
community is increasing. The Coalition government in the UK with 
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its austerity policies at home feels it is necessary to encourage 
greater fiscal discipline in the territories. The UK wants the 
territories to be financially self-reliant. However, the increasing 
criticism of the territories’ OFCs might put that at risk. 
Notwithstanding the UK remains a strong defender of the 
territories’ right to maintain their role in the offshore sector. As the 
recent White Paper suggests the UK ‘will continue to represent the 
interests of those Territories which meet [international standards]’ 
and ‘will strongly support their right to compete freely in 
international markets’.14 One reason for this support as highlighted 
in the White Paper is that ‘the international financial centres in the 
territories can play a positive and complementary role to the UK-
based financial services industry’.15 A second is that the UK wants 
the territories to be as economically independent as possible and 
the offshore sector helps them to be so. 
How might the present economic trends impact on the 
territories and their attitudes towards greater political autonomy? 
Well, greater financial discipline may help them by consolidating 
their economic position and minimising their vulnerability, despite 
some short-term resentment over the UK’s greater involvement in 
economic matters. On the other hand, the more hostile 
international attitude to their financial services industries might 
make the territories less confident about asking for more 
autonomy. The territories may well prefer to maintain the link with 
the UK and the useful level of protection that provides. 
 
ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE PRESENT CONSTITUTIONAL 
RELATIONSHIP 
 
From the UK government, the view is that the constitutional 
position is largely settled – at least for the time being. Over the last 
few years new constitutions have been agreed for the British Virgin 
Islands, the Cayman Islands, Montserrat, and the TCI (twice). Only 
Anguilla was unaffected by this process.16 With the exception of the 
TCI, the new constitutions afford new, albeit limited, 
responsibilities to the territories. For example, National Security 
Councils were created in the British Virgin Islands and the Cayman 
Islands, and a National Advisory Council in Montserrat, to advise 
the Governor on internal security and police matters. Provisions 
were also made for the devolution of new powers to the 
governments of the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands and 
Montserrat in the area of international affairs. Further, the new 
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constitutions included some symbolic changes which the territories 
requested. In the British Virgin Islands and the TCI the Legislative 
Council was renamed the House of Assembly, and in Montserrat it 
was renamed the Legislative Assembly. In three territories the title 
of Chief Minister was changed to Premier and the Executive Council 
was renamed the Cabinet, while in the Cayman Islands the title of 
Leader of Government Business was changed to Premier. 
Ultimately, however, the Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition 
government shares the position of the previous Labour 
government that limits should be placed on the territories’ 
constitutional room for manoeuvre in order to maintain the UK’s 
reserved powers and to safeguard the independence of the 
judiciary and the impartiality of the civil service. The UK now 
believes that rather than further constitutional reform the existing 
arrangements should be made to work better, and it is hoped that 
the provisions within the White Paper will help to do this. 
For the territories the picture is more mixed. In the British 
Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, and Montserrat there is general 
satisfaction with the status quo. However, in Anguilla and the TCI 
the rhetoric against the constitutional link is quite critical. 
Anguilla’s Chief Minister Hubert Hughes has called for complete 
internal self-government, and more recently full independence. 
After differences over the territory’s budget in 2011 Hughes called 
on Anguillans to ‘throw off the yoke of oppression’ and consider 
independence.17 Then in April 2013 Hughes said he wanted a 
referendum by the end of the year to consider two options: 
‘complete internal self-government or independence’.18 Note, 
moderate reform was not offered as an option.  
What should we make of the suggested referendum? First, it is 
not at all certain that a vote will be take place. Second, if a vote is 
held it is unlikely that independence will be favoured. Rather, the 
most likely result – support for complete self-government – could 
be used as a bargaining chip in an attempt to pressurise the UK 
government to devolve significant new powers in any new 
constitution. So far the UK has not been prepared to accept such 
changes unless a territory decides on a stage-by-stage process to 
independence. In addition, the PNP in the TCI announced in 
October 2011 that it would seek a referendum on independence if 
it won the next general election. Since the election Premier Rufus 
Ewing (of the PNP) has talked about the option of independence 
but has not committed to holding a referendum anytime soon. 
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Indeed, if a vote was held, it is unlikely to pass because of the 
recent poor record of the local political class. 
Indeed, key to facilitating any changes is enhancing the probity 
and good practice of the territory governments, and maintaining 
those standards consistently over the medium to long term. 
Without such action the UK will be reluctant to devolve further 
powers, and the local populations will be cautious about 
supporting independence. So the territories, with external support, 
must take steps to consolidate and in some cases improve the ways 




From the outset it can be stated that neither the UK nor the 
territories want a closer and more formal constitutional 
relationship that might involve direct representation for the 
territories in the UK parliament. Similarly, the possibility of 
independence appears only a distant possibility, despite recent talk 
in Anguilla. Then what about free association? As intimated above 
the UK has little enthusiasm for free association in large part 
because of the problems linked to Associated Statehood in the 
1960s and 1970s in countries such as Grenada, and the belief that 
free association is problematic in the cases where it operates today, 
for example the Cook Islands (with New Zealand) and the 
Federated States of Micronesia (with the United States). There is 
also reluctance on the UK’s part to allow the Caribbean territories 
to be given the same level of autonomy as Bermuda (which has one 
of the most devolved constitutional systems) because that would 
hinder UK oversight. Notwithstanding, there is evidence to suggest 
that some territories (such as Anguilla) would like greater 
autonomy and/or free association. 
A decade ago, the UK government set in motion a constitutional 
review process for the territories. For the first time the process 
was supposedly ‘locally owned rather than directed from 
London’.19 As a consequence, the territories hoped that 
fundamental reform would be undertaken. This impression was 
reinforced when the FCO failed initially to make its own position 
clear on the extent to which it would accept changes to the existing 
constitutions. Therefore the expectations for change on the part of 
the territories were high. The territories asked for a range of 
reforms, such as to reduce the power of the Governor and to 
increase the role of the elected government, to make the Attorney 
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General a political appointee, and to gain greater control over the 
public service and judicial appointments. Only then did the FCO 
step in and place clear limits on the territories’ options. The FCO 
minister at the time argued that the idea of free association ‘does 
not sit easily with our over-riding responsibility to ensure the good 
governance of the territories and compliance with applicable 
international obligations’.20 As we have seen this remains the case. 
So what are the possible routes towards decolonisation? One is 
that the territories make clear their contentment with the existing 
constitutional arrangements and ask to be removed from the UN’s 
list of non-self governing territories.21 Montserrat’s Premier 
Reuben Meade tentatively called for this in 2012. Meade argued 
that ‘the people of Montserrat have made their choice in choosing 
to continue as an overseas territory of the United Kingdom and do 
not see themselves as being a colony’.22 There is much to be said for 
the argument that the local territory population should have the 
final say over whether a territory is delisted by the UN, and that the 
UN should show some flexibility to allow this to happen, i.e. in 
relation to UN General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV) that 
considers ‘the emergence of any other political status freely 
determined by the people’ as a way of implementing the right to 
self determination.23 However, it has always been the view of the 
General Assembly that the Resolution should not legitimise models 
which do not offer a full measure of self government. 
Notwithstanding, there are two key considerations here. First, 
what is the view of the local (Montserratian) population? Without 
some kind of vote or referendum it is difficult to gauge what the 
view of the population is – they might not want independence but 
they may wish to have greater autonomy which the UK does not 
presently allow. It needs more than the word of the premier to 
judge the views of the people. Second, what happens if the view of 
the population changes and a new constitutional settlement is 
preferred? Under those circumstances could Montserrat be re-
listed? So perhaps the process of de-listing could be made more 
flexible, but the procedure for this to happen has to be clear and 
reversible. 
Another option is to support the UK preference and make the 
existing arrangements work more effectively and use the newly 
established Joint Ministerial Council to strengthen relations and 
build confidence between the UK and the territories, and to 
enhance political and economic governance in the territories. 
Would a stronger institutional structure focused on mutual benefit 
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be enough for de-listing? Perhaps not, but an effective Joint 
Ministerial Council could in the medium-term lead to greater 
autonomy being countenanced by the UK, including the reduction 
of the power of the Governor, strengthening the role of public 
service commissions, allowing the territories to appoint a political 
Attorney General, and limiting the power of the UK government to 
disallow laws enacted by the local legislatures. In short, if 
independence is not an option the UK government must gain 
reassurance that greater autonomy for the territories will not 




Over the last three years the UK coalition government has enacted 
a series of reforms to strengthen oversight and improve political 
and economic governance in the territories. However, many of 
these changes have been controversial and to counter disquiet in 
the territories the UK has attempted to build a more constructive 
and positive set of relations with them. The response of the 
territories to this has been mixed. Notwithstanding, it is clear that 
at the present time the routes towards decolonisation are limited. 
Independence, incorporation, and free association are not favoured 
by either the UK and/or the territories. One option is to enshrine 
the status quo, but several territories as well as the UN do not 
support this. Thus the most feasible way forward is to encourage 
further confidence building measures between the UK and its 
territories, and to enhance the territories political and economic 
viability. Only then might more substantial constitutional reform 
be possible. 
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